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MAINTENANCE, SHORESIDE WAGES, AND
MR. CROOKS: A PROPOSED END
TO TWIN BEDS AND SIX
MEALS A DAY
The recent Ninth Circuit decision of Crooks v. United States' reit-
erates the long established truism that admiralty courts will, whenever
possible, be munificent in awarding damages to injured seamen. In-
deed, it appears that the "poor and friendless seamen," described in
Justice Story's classic decision,2 have found the best friend they could
hope for-the courts of admiralty, bent on presenting them with ex-
tremely liberal damage and maintenance awards. This note will examine
the generosity of the Crooks award and will explore how other juris-
dictions have treated the compensation issues which it raises.
Crooks, the plaintiff-appellee, instituted a single admiralty actions
against the United States4 for personal injuries he received as a seaman
aboard ship. Crooks charged negligence against the United States and
sought damages as well as unpaid maintenance during the period of
physical disability following the accident. The district court which
initially heard the case awarded the plaintiff the sum of $16,773.00.
Included was $15,453.40 for lost earnings during the period of tempo-
rary total incapacity, loss of future earnings, medical specials, pain and
suffering and $1200.00 for unpaid maintenance plus $120.00 interest
thereon.5
On appeal, the government challenged the propriety of the dis-
trict court's award of $1200.00 maintenance in addition to the rather
ample negligence and unseaworthiness damages of over $15,000.00.6
Specifically, the government noted that plaintiffs prospective lost wages
1. 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
2. Hardin v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
3. This is to be distinguished from a civil action brought before the federal
courts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction as well as an action tried before a jury.
In the instant case, all issues were decided by the judges of the Ninth Circuit.
4. The United States was named as defendant because it owned the public vessel
SS Green Point. The Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. Sect. 741 et Seq. permits
such an action.
5. Brief for Appellee at 2, 3, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972). The $120.00 interest was conceded to be erroneous by stipulation of the ap-
pellee, and will not be further discussed in this note.
6. The government was specifically concerned with that part of the plaintiff's
[935]
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were computed by reference to a period which included a considerable
amount of shoreside service.7  This was because the plaintiff's employ-
ment during the fifteen months preceding the voyage was divided be-
tween landed and seaside service.8 The government contended that
since shoreside wages already included the element of maintenance (a
person employed ashore is expected to maintain himself out of his wage
and hence such wages are computed accordingly), an allowance of
maintenance in addition to shoreside wages would amount to a double
recovery.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument and affirmed the lower court's decision with a slight modifi-
cation not relevant to this discussion.°
Maintenance and Cure and the Wardship Concept
It is difficult to appreciate the Crooks decision without a nominal
understanding of two basic principles: the extremely liberal nature
of the maintenance award11 and the admiralty court's historical solici-
tude for the welfare of seamen, who are considered its wards.
12
The right to maintenance and cure" arises when the seaman
signs articles, and continues until he has received his discharge.' 4 Any
recovery whch encompassed prospective lost wages during the period of the plain-
tiff's temporary total incapacity, some $4,761.15 of the total negligence recovery.
The amounts allocated for pain and suffering and decreased capacity to earn wages
in the future were not contested on appeal.
7. In general, a seaman's wages are computed with recognition of the fact
that he will be housed and fed aboard his vessel for the duration of the voyage. Ac-
cordingly, his shipside wages reflect this form of indirect compensation by being
somewhat lower than a landed employee's salary for similar duties. For this reason
it has long been recognized that a seaman who is stricken while in the service of his
vessel should be given a special award to maintain and care for himself while re-
cuperating ashore. The award represents compensation for the meals and lodging
which are tacitly included on his wage, but which the seaman cannot take advantage
of when he is not aboard his vessel. See text accompanying notes 11-29 infra, where
the maintenance remedy is more fully discussed. See generally G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, §§ 6-6 to 6-9 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE
& BLACK]; 2 M. NoRis, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 538-611 (3d. ed. 1970).
8. Brief for Appellant at 8, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972).
9. Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1972).
10. Id. at 635. The $120.00 interest award was omitted from the district
court's judgment.
11. See text accompanying notes 11-27 infra.
12. See, e.g., Norris, The Seaman As Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. REV.
479 (1954); See text accompanying note 28 infra.
13. "Cure" means care, nursing and medicine and was not involved in the
Crooks litigation. See also, Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
See generally, GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 6-11, 2 M. NoRRIs, THE LAw OF
SEAMEN § 543 (3d ed. 1970).
14. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 6-7.
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discussion of this ancient remedy must begin with the oft-quoted re-
marks of Justice Story in Hardin v. Gordon:15
[The right to maintenance and cure] appears to me so consonant
with humanity, with sound policy, and with national interests ...
Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sick-
ness. . . . They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire
habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence. If
some provision be not made for them in sickness at the expense
of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer . . . disease,
and poverty, and sometimes perish from the want of suitable nour-
ishment. Their common earnings . . . are wholly inadequate to
provide for the expenses of sickness. . .. Beyond this, is the
great public policy of preserving this important class of citizens
for the commercial service and maritime defence of the nation.18
The more recent case of Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.17 re-examined the
nature and scope of maintenance, deeming it "among the most per-
vasive incidents of the responsibility anciently imposed upon a ship-
owner for the health and security of sailors .... ,,18 The Supreme
Court noted that the obligation was created by the contract of employ-
ment and that liability for maintenance, unlike liability under the Jones
Act,'" is in no sense predicated on the fault or negligence of the ship-
owner. Explicitly, it stated that, "[s]o broad is the shipowner's obli-
gation, that negligence or acts short of culpable misconduct on the sea-
man's part will not relieve him of the responsibility."
20
Indeed, the injury or illness need not be causally related to the
seaman's shipboard duties, as long as it manifests itself during the
course of the voyage." Thus, in a series of Supreme Court
cases, maintenance was allowed when an incurable vascular disease
manifested itself while a seaman was in the employ of the ship,
22
where a seaman on shore leave fell into a ditch,23 where a seaman was
struck by a car on shore leave, 24 and even where the seaman over-
15. 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
16. Id., at 483. Another oft-cited rationale for extreme liberality in the grant-
ing of the maintenance award is to provide "inducement to masters and owners to
protect the safety and health of seamen while in service . . ." and to strengthen the
maritime marine "by inducing men to accept employment in an arduous and perilous
service." Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
17. 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
18. Id. at 730.
19. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The Jones Act states that any seaman who
suffers personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain
an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such an action
all Federal Employee's Liability Act statutes shall apply. Id.
20. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730-31 (1943).
21. See, e.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
22. Id.
23. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Jones, 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
24. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
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stayed his leave and was injured wholly through his own negligence.2 5
Perhaps the zenith of zeal in awarding maintenance came in a New
York state case 26 awarding maintenance and cure to a sailor who had
suffered a fractured leg while making a hasty exit from a Yugoslavian
brothel. Broadly speaking,
[m]isconduct on board ship as well as misconduct ashore will
forfeit the right [to maintenance and cure], but the courts have
not been inclined to construe misconduct as including what the
opinions call 'horseplay'. It is apparent . ..that negligence or
contributory negligence of even the grossest kind will not of itself
qualify as misconduct and forfeit the right.27
The corollary rationale for the extreme liberality afforded the in-
capacitated seaman in the area of maintenance and cure is the notion
that seamen are the wards of the admiralty courts and therefore must
be carefully protected in virtually every area of their existence .
2
Hence, as early as 1823, there are descriptions of seamen as "poor
and friendless [with] habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and im-
providence .... '29 The passage of one hundred and fifty years
since Story's famous appraisal has not fundamentally altered this con-
cept
0
It is against this two-pronged backdrop of broadly construed
maintenance obligations and judicial paternalism towards seamen, that
the Crooks decision must be viewed. Indeed the court explicitly noted
that:
The Court [in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.] observed in addition
[to maintenance and cure being among the most pervasive of all
liabilities of the shipowner] that Admiralty out of historic solici-
tude for the welfare of its wards construes liberally all doubts
and ambiguities in favor of maintenance awards. . . This rule
of interpretation is of assistance in the case before us.
31
25. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
26. Koistinen v. American Export Lines, Inc., 83 N.Y.S.2d 297, 194 Misc. 942
(N.Y. City Ct. 1948), cited in GILMoR & BLACK, supra note 7, at 260.
27. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 260. "Negligence, whether it is char-
acterized as active, passive, ordinary or gross, does not defeat a seaman's claim for
maintenance and cure, for his conduct is not measured by a standard of due care.
There must be an element of wilfulness about it in order to deprive him of his tradi-
tional right .... Neither the rules of contributory negligence, comparative negli-
gence, the fellow servant doctrine, assumption of risk, or that of fault, have any place
in the liability or defense against it." Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty,
52 MICH. L. REv. 479, 494 (1954).
28. Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. REV. 479
(1954). See also Brabazon v. Belship Co., 198 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1952).
29. Hardin v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1833).
30. See J. Lovitt, Things Are Seldom What They Seem: The Jolly Little Wards
of the Admiralty, 46 A.B.A.J. 171 (1960), for a comic and devastating analysis of the
preferential treatment accorded seamen.
31. Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 634, n.12 (9th Cir. 1972).
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The Multi-Faceted Problem of the Double Recovery
The injured seaman is generally in a position to seek recovery
through a wide variety of remedies. This plethora of available reme-
dies is largely responsible for the variety of contexts in which the "dou-
ble recovery" problem surfaces, as well as some of the confusion which
surrounds it.
As has previously been illustrated, 2 the seaman's right to main-
tenance, cure and wages for the duration of the voyage is in no sense
predicated on the shipowner's negligence or fault, but rather is a quasi-
contractual duty arising from the contract of employment. 33 There are
generally three separate items of recovery in such an action. The first
of these is maintenance, which is a living allowance sufficient to enable
the seaman to maintain himself in a manner "comparable to that to
which the seaman is entitled while at sea . . . . 3 The second item
is cure, or care, which consists of the expenses of medical treatment.
The right to cure extends until there is such improvement in the sea-
man's condition as may be expected from continued care.35 The last
item comprises the seaman's wages, computed to the end of the voyage
the seaman was on when he was incapacitated.3 6
Where there is evidence of actionable negligence, or breach of the
shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, a second group of rem-
edies inures to the benefit of the seaman. Unlike maintenance and cure,
with its contractual origins, these provisions arise from the law of tort
and hence are separate and distinct claims not per se affecting the sea-
man's rights to maintenance under the general maritime law.37  They
include the remedies provided in the Jones Act,3 8 common law negli-
gence, and the unseaworthiness doctrine.39 A suit under the Jones Act
is substantially the same as a common law suit for negligence or a
maritime action for unseaworthiness. The potential elements of re-
32. See text accompanying notes 19-27 supra.
33. See, e.g., Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932).
See generally 2 M. NoRRs, THE LAw OF SEAMEN § 539 (3d ed. 1970).
34. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938). This has, how-
ever, been given the broadest kind of construction. See text accompanying notes
70-79 infra.
35. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. at 530.
36. See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903); Bartholomew v. Universe Tank-
ships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir. 1960), which contains the following language:
"It is important to note that if an incapacitated seaman has been put on shore before
the end of the voyage there will be a period when he is entitled to recover in a main-
tenance and cure action not only for room and board and medical expenses but also
for wages. .. "
37. See, e.g., The W.H. Hoodless, 38 1. Supp. 432, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
38. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
39. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
covery under either include medical expenses, past and prospective, in-
demnity for loss of earnings, past and prospective, and an award for
the seaman's physical injuries and pain and suffering.40
It is therefore axiomatic that some of the elements of damages
available to the injured seaman under a tort claim are identical to those
to which he is entitled under the admiralty doctrine of maintenance and
cure. Nonetheless, while "[tihe right to maintenance, cure and wages,
implied in law as a contractual obligation arising out of the nature of
the employment, is independent of the right to indemnity or com-
pensatory damages for an injury caused by negligence; and these two
rights are consistent and cumulative . .. "' the seaman cannot recover
twice for the same elements of damage.12  The real issue rests on
whether such duplication occurs.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that unseaworthi-
ness or negligence claims often are submitted to a jury for considera-
tion as a civil claim, while maintenance and cure may be decided by
the judge, sitting in admiralty. 43 When the jury returns a general ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff, the judge is faced with the difficult prob-
lem of deciding whether that verdict is inclusive of damages which may
be within the maintenance and cure area.4"
It is this multiplicity of available remedies and procedures that
40. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 916 (2d
Cir. 1960).
41. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928).
42. See, e.g., Vickers v. Tumey, 290 F.2d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 1961); McCarty
v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1949); Smith v. Lykes
Brothers-Ripley S.S. Co., 105 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir. 1939).
43. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc., 279 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1960) (maintenaace and cure claim reserved for the judge, negligence claim decided
by the jury). The courts are divided on the question of whether maintenance and
cure claims must be decided by the judge. Since maintenance and cure is a right
which arises under the maritime law, it may always be sought in the admiralty juris-
diction of the court. However, when the negligence and unseaworthiness action is
submitted to the jury, most courts will let the maintenance and cure count go to the
jury along with the damages count. GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, § 6-9. See, e.g.,
Garrett v. Moore-McCormick Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). See also Rosequist v. Isth-
mian S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953). Where this occurs the possibility of
overlap or double recovery looms large. Often the jury's verdict in the negligence count
is so broad as to include those elements which are traditionally within the maintenance
and cure area. It is the duty of the trial judge to see that this does not occur.
44. "We think the test to be applied in the determination of this issue, in cases
where plaintiff has been awarded a substantial recovery, is a simple one: the items of
damage specified and included in the instructions to the jury are presumed to be
included in the general verdict and there may be no later allowance for any of such
items by way of maintenance and cure. We further hold that as to this defense of
duplication or prior payment the defendant must bear the burden of proof." Bar-
tholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 915-16 (2d Cir. 1960).
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often results in the situation where an injured party brings separate
actions45 in the hopes of maximizing his total recovery and perhaps
recovering overlapping damages.40  Hence,
[a]lthough remedies for negligence, unseaworthiness and main-
tenance and cure have different origins and may on occasion call
for application of slightly different principles and procedures, they
nevertheless, when based on one unitary set of circumstances, serve
the same purpose of indemnifying a seaman for damages caused
by injury, depend in large part upon the same evidence, and in-
volve some identical elements of recovery.
47
These identical elements loom large in the disposition of maritime
lawsuits where alleged double recoveries are sought by the plaintiff.
Decisions Involving Double Recovery
The body of case law on the double recovery problem is diverse
and perhaps confusing to those not versed in the application of mari-
time remedies. This note has outlined the available legal courses of
action open to the injured seaman;48 this section will attempt to lead
the reader through some of the more important decisions which have
grappled with the problem. In order to appreciate the complexity and
scope of this area of the law of admiralty, it is helpful to survey some
of the leading cases.
The case law presents a veritable panoply of different applica-
tions of the overlapping damages problem. Some of the suits are such
blatant efforts at recovering duplicate awards, that it seems almost
absurd that they were litigated. Thus, in McCarthy v. American East-
ern Corp.49 the injured seaman's wages included cash as well as room
and board. In his civil claim for damages, on a theory of negligence
and unseaworthiness, the libellant included not only cash wages lost
by reason of his injuries but also the cash value of the board and
lodging which he would have received had he remained in the employ
of the respondent. In a separate action in admiralty, however, the
45. See, e.g., Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928), allowing su~ch a
procedure.
46. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships Inc., 279 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1960). "While the seaman may not split his tort claim into fragments and sue at
various times for one part of his damages and then for another [citations] he need not
claim or seek to establish at the trial of the counts based on negligence and unsea-
worthiness all the damages to which he may be entitled." Id. at 916 (emphasis
added). See also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 18 (1963).
47. Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 18 (1963) (emphasis added). See
also Gooden v. Sinclair Refining Co., 378 F. 2d 576 (3d Cir. 1967), "[A] seaman
cannot have both damages and maintenance and cure if there would result any dupli-
cation of recovery upon a single .laim." Id. at 581.
48. See text accompanying notes 32-44 supra.
49. 175 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
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plaintiff-appellant sought maintenance for precisely the same period.
By successfully recovering the cash value of his lost room and board
in his negligence action, the seaman had in fact recovered precisely
those amounts which are normally encompassed in a maintenance
award. In short, the libellant was seeking a windfall.50  The court of
appeals appropriately refused to grant the maintenance recovery, noting
that:
The ancient rule in the admiralty that the vessel and her owner
must provide an injured seaman with maintenance was intended
to assure him three meals a day and a bed in which to sleep
during his treatment and convalescence. There is no basis in
logic or law for assuming that he may ask for six meals a day
or twin beds .... 51
In Muise v. Abbott,52 the First Circuit dealt with an analogous
problem. There, the seaman was injured on a defective wharf while
returning from authorized shore leave. He brought an action in tort
against the wharf owner and settled for $5,500. He then proceeded
against the shipowner for maintenance and cure in the amount of
$1949.78 ($1039.78 for medical expenses and $910.00 for main-
tenance during the period of his convalescence). The court recog-
nized that the rights of the seaman to seek compensatory damages on
a tort theory and maintenance on a maritime-contractual theory are
consistent and cumulative. Nevertheless, it held that:
it does not follow from this . . . that [appellant] can recover
full damages in both of the actions available to him. The reason
for this is that the damages recoverable in each action to some
extent overlap and the rule prevails in admiralty . . . that no one
may recover compensatory damages more than once.53
The First Circuit accordingly upheld the lower tribunal's decision
which awarded the plaintiff only part of the maintenance and cure
which he had claimed. The court determined that part of the seaman's
tort settlement was compensation for his medical care and maintenance
and the shipowner was not required to further compensate the plaintiff
for these amounts. 54
Similarly, if the seaman claims wages until the end of the voyage
as part of his maintenance, cure and wages remedy, he is precluded
50. It should be observed, however, that in certain situations, a plaintiff-seaman
will recover more than he actually lost. "But this is a result of the unique nature of
the rights granted by the maritime law to the seafaring man . . ." Richardson v.
St. Charles-St. John Baptist Bridge & Ferry Authority, 284 F. Supp. 709, 713 (E.D.
La. 1968).
51. McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 727, 729 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
52. 160 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1947).
53. Id. at 592.
54. Id.
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from seeking indemnity for lost wages encompasing this period (from
the injury until the end of the voyage) in a separate action for com-
pensatory damages on a negligence theory. This problem squarely con-
fronted the Fifth Circuit in the case of Vickers v. Tumey.55 There,
the court also faced the procedural situation in which the jury decided
the negligence claim and the judge, sitting in admiralty, made the
maintenance, wages and cure determination. 6 The court disposed of
the problem stating that "since the element of wages . . . is inherent
in each of the two types of recoveries, there must not be a duplication
in the final awar4 whether it is done . . . by a jury hearing both
phases. . or partly by the jury and partly by the Judge."5
Many courts state that only amounts necessary and actually ex-
pended by the injured seaman either for hospital care5 s or for food
and lodging59 are recoverable in an action for maintenance and cure.
There are, however, contrary decisions. 60 Significantly, in the leading
case in this area, 61 where the seaman was denied maintenance and
cure because he stayed with his parents during recuperation, he had
refused to avail himself of the Public Health Service facilities. On the
narrower question of whether he would be denied maintenance had
no such offer been made, it is difficult to speculate whether the Su-
preme Court would render the same determination.
55. 290 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1961). No duplication was found on the facts of
the particular suit but the discussion of the problem is nevertheless noteworthy.
56. Id. at 434-35. The court dismissed the very limited nature of the wages (in
the maintenance-wages-cure sense) award, noting that "[w]hile loss of wages as an
element of damages may perhaps extend almost indefinitely for the probable employ-
able life of the seaman, that is not so with regard to this limited duty to pay wages as
part of cure . . . wages in the maintenance-wages-cure sense is a very limited award
[and] such wages are due as a matter of right wholly without regard to unseaworthi-
ness or negligence or both. Id. at 434-435. See also note 36 supra.
57. 290 F.2d at 435. See also Ortiz v. Grace Lines Inc., 250 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.
1957)-
58. The seaman is permitted no recovery for maintenance or cure during the
time he stays in a Public Health Service Hospital, since he has been sustained
during these periods at no cost to himself or his family. See generally 2 M. NORMus,
THE LAW OF SEAMN § 572 (3d ed. 1970).
59. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 50 (1948) (seaman stayed at
his parents' home during recovery period and incurred no expense to himself for main-
tenance); Numes v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 147, 148 (D.C. Mass.) rev'd on
other grounds, 227 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1955) (seaman stayed with mother during his
period of recuperation).
60. See, e.g., Boboricken v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 70 (D.C. Wash. 1947);
Brinkman v. Oil Transfer Corp., 300 N.Y. 48, 88 N.E.2d 817 (1949). Both of these
cases involved relatively young seamen, however, and the courts apparently felt that
the plaintiff's parents should not be burdened with their son's upkeep in lieu of the
shipowner. The general rule, however, prevents such recovery. 2 M. NoRRis, THE
LAw OF SEAMEN § 573 (3d ed. 1970).
61. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 50 (1948).
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The rationale for denying recovery in these situations is apparent.
Since the seaman is cared for at no expense to himself, the hoary
picture of a disabled sailor rotting away in a foreign port, or indeed
an American city, is merely idle imagery. Allowing a recovery for
costs never incurred would be a windfall, and that was never the his-
toric purpose of the maintenance and cure remedy.6
2
It should be noted, that in their zeal to prevent a so-called double
recovery, some decisions in the Second Circuit 3 erroneously held that
as a matter of law, "plaintiff cannot recover maintenance and cure in
addition to loss of wages, for the same periods. ''0 4  Interestingly, in a
case so holding, Evans v. Schneider,"5 the court cited the McCarthy v.
American Eastern Corp.66 decision as supportive authority for its overly
broad declaration. Nevertheless, as pointed out,0 7 the McCarthy case
stands for the more limited proposition that where the seaman includes
the value of his room and board in his claim for lost wages, he there-
after cannot recover amounts for maintenance in a separate claim.
This is not to say that where he only seeks the net amount of lost
seaman's wages (which are generally computed with recognition of the
fact that they "tacitly" include a food and lodging increment and are
therefore lower than landed wages for similar duties) he should be pre-
cluded from thereafter seeking his maintenance in a separate suit.
Furthermore, the Evans court cited with approval the case of Perez v.
Suivanee Steamship Co.,6s which was subsequently overruled by the
United States Supreme Court. 9 It is therefore apparent that the vi-
tality of the Evans decision is open to strong, indeed compelling,
doubts.
While the courts espouse a general prohibition against double re-
coveries, they have not limited awards merely to the compensation
needed to make the claimant whole. For example, the Ninth Circuit
awarded maintenance to an injured seaman who was not supplied his
meals while on board ship, but was required to pay for them himself.
In The City of Avalon7" the court increased the libellant's maintenance
award and thereby compensated him for food expenditures during his
recovery period. Largely relying on policy considerations, the court
62. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
63. Evans v. Schneider, 250 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1957); Ortiz v. Grace Lines, Inc.,
250 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
64. Evans v. Schneider, 250 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1957).
65. Id. at 712.
66. 175 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
67. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
68. 239 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
69. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 533-34, rehearing denied, 370 U.S.
965 (1962).
70. 156 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1946).
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rejected the appellee's contention that the libellant should be denied a
maintenance award for his meals since he paid for his own food while
working on board ship. The court interpreted the statement in Calmar
S.S. Corp. v. Taylor that "[t]he maintenance exacted is comparable to
that to which the seaman is entitled while at sea . . .,rl7 to mean no
more than that an injured man during his disability is to be maintained
in no better or worse condition than he was at sea. 72 Hence, even
though the appellant would not be entitled to food as part of his wage
contract, he would have paid for it and surely would have eaten. Con-
sequently, the shipowner had the duty to see that the injured party be
maintained in a comparable condition-that he be supplied with food
-despite the fact that in the latter instance the food costs would be
borne by the shipowner.
The City of Avalon was followed by a series of district court
cases in Louisiana. In Richardson v. St. Charles-St. John the Baptist
Bridge and Ferry Authority,73 a ferryboat deckhand was permitted to
recover both lost wages and maintenance notwithstanding the fact that
the shipowners never provided him with room and board. While ac-
knowledging the general prohibition against double recovery, the dis-
trict court made the following determination:
[the claim] does not present a situation in which a plaintiff is
seeking to recover twice for the same elements of damage. To be
sure, if [he] is awarded both compensatory damages and main-
tenance, he will recover more than he has actually lost. But this is
a result of the unique nature of the rights granted by the maritime
law to the seafaring man. .... 74
Sylve v. E.W. Gravolet Canning Co.75 presented an almost identical
factual situation. The libellant brought an action for damages based
on unseaworthiness under the general maritime law, negligence under
the Jones Act, and maintenance and cure. The vessel on which he
was injured was an oyster boat worked by him and two others near
the shore. Though not explicitly stated in the decision, in all likeli-
hood the injured seaman slept and ate ashore. He received no food
from his employer. Nevertheless, the court, reiterating the pervasive
nature of the maintenance and cure remedy, awarded him eight dol-
lars per day for the 481 day period during which he was an outpa-
tient. The court cited with approval the rule that maintenance must be
provided an injured seaman even though that seaman is not normally
furnished meals and lodging aboard the vessel. No double recovery
71. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
72. The City of Avalon, 156 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1946).
73. 284 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1968).
74. Id. at 713.
75. 278 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. La. 1967).
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problem was found to be present. 6
The Second Circuit dealt with the same problem in Weiss v. Cen-
tral Railroad of New Jersey.77 Weiss worked an eight-hour day on a
ferryboat on the Hudson River. He was paid an hourly wage and
was an "extra hand" aboard the vessel. He lived and ate his meals on
shore. The principle issue in the case was whether the plaintiff was
a "seaman" entitled to sue under the Jones Act and recover main-
tenance and cure under maritime law. After an examination of nu-
merous cases, the court held that the injured deckhand was entitled to
sue as a seaman. 71 On the issue of whether he should be denied
maintenance and cure, the court was explicit:
We know of no authority . . . for holding that a seaman is not
entitled to the traditional privileges of his status merely because
his voyages are short, because he sleeps ashore, or for other rea-
sons his lot is more pleasant than that of most of his brethren.7
9
Indeed, in all of the previously mentioned decisions the seaman,
by virtue of the maintenance award, was compensated for something
which he ordinarily supplied himself-board and lodging. Neverthe-
less, considering the extreme liberality with which the courts surround
the maintenance and cure remedy, 80 these rulings are not surprising,
and apparently they are not within the prohibition against double re-
covery.
A final problem which crops up with less regularity,8" but nev-
ertheless tangentially concerns the issue of double recovery, is the courts'
treatment of wages earned by the injured seaman before he has reached
maximum recovery. The issue here is whether these amounts should
be offset against maintenance allowances which the seaman would
otherwise have by right. Historically, the courts of appeals were split
on this problem, 2 and it was not resolved with finality until the United
76. Id. at 674. See also Hudspeth v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevadores, Inc., 266 F.
Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1967).
77. 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956).
78. Id. at 313.
79. Id. See also Bailey v. City of New York, 55 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
Judge Lumbard's dissent in Weiss is an intelligent and well-documented argument for
the proposition that maintenance and cure has its origins in the peculiar relationship
between a seaman and his ship. Consonant with this idea, that to a full-time seaman
the ship is not only the place of work, but indeed the framework of his existence
during a voyage, the maintenance and cure remedy has evolved to compensate such
people for their loss of a "home", so to speak. Judge Lumbard felt that where such a
relation between the seaman and his vessel does not exist, as with the plaintiff in
Weiss, maintenance should be denied. 235 F.2d at 313.
80. See text accompanying notes 16-27 supra.
81. Note, 47 U. VA. L. REv. 1077, 1081 (1961).
82. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1962). See also Note, 47
U. VA. L. REV. 1077 (1961).
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States Supreme Court's holding in Vaughan v. Atkinson.8 3 There, as
a matter of law the Court held that earnings during the period before
the seaman is maximally cured are not to be used as an offset against
maintenance and cure. The Court was largely guided by general pol-
icy considerations:
It would be a sorry day for seamen if shipowners, knowing of the
claim for maintenance and cure, could disregard it, force the dis-
abled seaman to work, and then evade part or all of their legal
obligation by having it reduced by the amount of the sick man's
earnings. This would be a dreadful weapon in the hands of un-
conscionable employers and a plain inducement . . . to use the
withholding of maintenance and cure as a means of forcing sick
seamen to go to work when they should be resting, and to make
the seamen themselves pay in whole or in part the amounts owing
as maintenance and cure. This result is at war with the liberal
attitude that heretofore has obtained and with admiralty's tender
regard for seamen.8 4
In conclusion, these and other cases seem to hold that double
recovery comes into play: (1) where the actual food and lodging
cost has been borne by the employer, as where the seaman seeks and
gets the value of the food and lodging provided him while aboard ship
(as part of his tort recovery) as well as maintenace for the same pe-
riod; (2) where the food and lodging costs are borne by a third party,
and the seaman thereafter seeks maintenance and cure for the same pe-
riod; and (3) where wages until the end of the voyage are provided
as part of the maintenance-wages-cure remedy, and the seaman there-
after seeks these amounts in a separate Jones Act or unseaworthiness
action.
The Novelty of the Crooks Case
Crooks v. United States85 presents the more arcane aspects of the
double recovery problem and lies within the gray areas of a number
of the cases previously discussed in this note. The precise issue it pre-
sents is a novelty upon which no other court of appeals decision is
squarely in point.88 Nevertheless, by a process of extrapolation, it can be
determined that while the Ninth Circuit's decision is extremely liberal in
the ultimate award, such an award is consonant with historical precedent
and supported by deep-rooted policy considerations. While this may
seem to justify the decision, it does not foreclose the more analytical
approach which this note will propose.
Preliminarily, it should be observed that Crooks does not fall within
83. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
84. Id., at 533 (emphasis added).
85. 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cr. 1972).
86. Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1972).
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any of the neat categories of proscribed double recovery. Hence, in
order to avoid the pitfalls of the McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp. 7
decision (where the libellant included the cash value of his room and
board in his negligence claim and then sought maintenance and cure)
counsel for Crooks "explicitly excluded from his past gross earnings
basic allowances he had received for room and board while employed
as a seaman ... ."88
Nor does the prohibition against collecting wages to the end of
the voyage (as part of the maintenance-wages-cure remedy) and sub-
sequently seeking these amounts in the negligence claim as damages
arise. 9 In Crooks, the plaintiff received unearned wages until March
18, 1967, 90 presumably the end of the voyage, and sought his com-
pensatory damages for the period beginning after this date. Neverthe-
less, the dissenting judge mysteriously disagreed with the majority on
the ground that the "award of maintenance amounted to a double re-
covery,"91 citing Vickers v. Tumey92 as authority for his viewpoint.
It is readily apparent, however, that Vickers v. Tumey was not even
in point. The situation in the Vickers case was one in which the plain-
tiff sought to recover wages until the end of the voyage within the
maintenance remedy and lost wages covering this identical period in
his negligence action. As previously indicated,93 the plaintiff Crooks
made no such attempt.
Finally, there was no dispute over maintenance allowances for the
period of time in which the seaman recuperated in the Public Health
Service hospital. The plaintiff excluded these periods when he com-
puted the number of days for which he claimed maintenance.9"
Lost Wages and Shoreside Employment
The threshold issue concerned the propriety of awarding the plain-
87. 175 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
88. Brief for Appellee at 2, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972) (emphasis added). It is of great importance to note that while the plaintiff
excluded his food allowance from his lost shipside wages which comprised about four
months of working time prior to the voyage on which he was injured, a fifteen month
period was used to compute his average monthly wage. For the eleven other months,
the court examined the plaintiff's shoreside earnings which necessarily included an in-
crement for "maintenance".
89. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
90. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1972).
91. Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1972).
92. 290 F.2d 426, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1961).
93. Brief for Appellant at 6, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972).
94. Id. From March 18 to April 14 and from September 11 to September 25,
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
April 19733 MAINTENANCE AND SHORESIDE WAGES
tiff lost wages in his negligence claim which were largely based on
shoreside salary rates, as well as maintenance for an identical time span.
During the period of incapacity resulting from the accident, Crooks
claimed $4,761.15 in prospective lost wages.95 He also sought main-
tenance of $8.00 a day for this same calendar period.96 The dates
utilized in computing the maintenance award were not disputed by the
United States.97 Furthermore, the government did not seek to reliti-
gate the district court's finding of negligence and unseaworthiness.
What was vehemently contested was the total award which Crooks
ultimately received: "In light of the district court's method of com-
puting plaintiff's recovery for lost wages. . . the United States contends
that no maintenance should have been awarded.
98
In computing the quantum of prospective wages which the plain-
tiff lost as a result of the defendant's negligence, the court used a fif-
teen month period prior to the voyage on which the accident occurred
to determine the plaintiff's average monthly wage. It was decided that
examination of such a period would serve as a probable index to his
future work patterns. During this span, the libellant was employed
as a seaman for approximately four and one half months. For the re-
mainder he was engaged in nonseagoing occupations. 99 Hence, two-
thirds of his salary during this period was a result of shoreside em-
ployment.
The defendant-appellant argued that computation of post-injury
lost wages by extrapolating preinjury earnings which encompassed a
period during which the seaman worked ashore without receiving his
room and board from his employer would be permissible by itself.
However, where maintenance is awarded on top of these amounts for the
identical period, a double recovery necessarily occurs. 100
Logically, if a seaman is awarded lost wages based on landed
employment earning rates, which are not diminished as seaman's wages
are by the tacit increment for room and board, as well as a maintenance
allowance for the identical period, he will certainly be recovering more
than he has lost. Salaries which are based on shoreside employment
are sufficiently remunerative to afford their recipient the necessary
the plaintiff was a patient in the Public Health Service hospital and therefore was not
entitled to maintenance; nor did he seek it for these periods.
95. Brief for Appellee at 2, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972).




99. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1972).
100. Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1972).
amenities of life, including food and lodging. Therefore, it might be
concluded that as to the period for which the plaintiff recovered shore-
side wages (some two-thirds of his recovery in terms of a percentage),
his "maintenance" was already covered.
Nevertheless, the seaman is afforded maintenance at the expense
of the shipowner even where his seaside salary did not include a food
or board allowance. In this line of cases it may be said that the ship-
side wage is the equivalent of the shoreside wage-the room and board
expense is paid by the seaman himself, with no assistance from the
employer. Despite this, the courts so holding have not found the main-
tenance award to constitute a double recovery.
Wright v. Cion Corp. Peruna Desvaspores
On the precise facts of Crooks (where the seaman has only re-
cently engaged in maritime service and his previous working record,
from which his prospective lost wages will be computed, is based on
landed employment) there is only one lower court decision. In a New
York District Court Case, Wright v. Cion Corp. Peruna Desvaspores,"'0
the injured plaintiff sought recovery of lost prospective earnings during
his period of incapacity as well as a maintenance allotment for the
identical time span. For a long period before the voyage the libellant
had not engaged in maritime employment. In determining the extent
of his damages, the judge looked to his prior working record. On the
plaintiff's claim for lost prospective wages the court made an award
of $106 per week-the salary he received "next subsequent to the ac-
cident.' 10 2  However, apparently on the premise that such salary
included an element of support, in the nature of room and board, the
judge refused to allow any amount for maintenance:
I realize ...that in the ordinary seaman's case my finding that
Hughes was disabled from working . ..would at least prima
facie, entitle him to a recovery for maintenance during that period.
... There would be some question whether an award for loss
of earnings and an award for maintenance for the same period
would constitute a double recovery . . . . [A]n award of main-
tenance [here] would give such a double recovery . . . .The rec-
ord is barren of any evidence that he intended to follow the calling
of the sea subsequent [to this voyage] since it has not been shown
that he would ...be working aboard a ship during his period
of incapacity where he would be given his room and board in
addition to wages, I determine that no recovery for maintenance
should be allowed.
10 3
While bare logic may support such an argument, the law of ad-
miralty is not grounded in bare logic. The Wright decision presents
101. 171 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
102. Id. at 742.
103. Id. at 742-43.
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a sharp departure from the notion that maintenance is one of the most
pervasive liabilities of the shipowner and ought not be narrowly con-
fined. It also seems to ignore another fundamental, albeit question-
able rationale for the remedy-that is, "the maintenance of a merchant
marine for the commercial service and maritime defense of the nation
by inducing men to accept employment in an arduous and perilous serv-
ice."1
04
It is difficult to see how narrow interpretations of the availability
of maintenance, which preclude a person from its benefits simply be-
cause his previous employment was nonmaritime, can be said to induce
men to accept such employment. The maintenance and cure remedy
provides the injured seaman with a simple and certain allowance to
sustain him on shore. Arguably, if the seaman subsequently insti-
tutes a negligence suit'0 5 and recovers his previous shoreside wages for
the period of his disability in addition to maintenance, he will be re-
covering more than his actual loss. Nevertheless, cases which have
awarded maintenance to seamen who never slept or ate aboard ship,
or who paid for their food out of their wage, have permitted just such
a "bonus.' 0 6
The Rejection of Wright
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit chose to reject the holding of
Wright'0 7 and adhere to historical precedent and "fundamental" mari-
time policy in allowing Crooks to recover both maintenance and wages
which were largely based on shoreside salary rates. Although the re-
ported decision does not discuss it, the court was apparently influenced
by the plaintiff's amicus curiae brief. Essentially that brief argued
that if the government's position were adopted, the courts would be
forced to engage in a hopelessly unadministrable review of each claim-
ant's preinjury employment record. This would be necessary to de-
termine if the prospective lost wages were of a landed or maritime
status. 0 8  Aside from this burdensome task, the amicus curiae noted
that if the position contrary to theirs were taken,
104. Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938) (emphasis added).
105. As to negligence suits after injury as a means of recovery, Justice Stewart,
in Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 537-38, rehearing denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962),
noted the following: "The adequate protection of an injured or ill seaman against
suffering and want requires more than the assurance that he will receive payments at
some time in the indefinite future. Payments must be promptly made, at a time
contemporaneous to the illness or injury. And for this reason the maintenance rem-
edy should be kept simple, uncluttered by fine distinctions which breed litigation, with
its attendant delays and expenses."
106. See text accompanying notes 69-79 supra.
107. 171 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
108. Brief for Appellee as Amicus Curiae at 4, Crooks v. United States, 459
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a seaman who accepts shoreside employment risks forfeiture of his
remedy of maintenance, should he later elect to seek shipboard
service and then incur injuries. A result of this would . . tend
to discourage future shipboard service (contrary to general pol-
icy) ....
Furthermore, Appellant's position would create an artificial limi-
tation on the remedy between seamen who in the more or less
recent past have worked ashore, and those who have worked
aboard ship [and] would . . . be unfair. . .10
While policy may have militated in favor of awarding Crooks full
maintenance in addition to lost shoreside wages, economics dictated a
contrary result. At the time of the injury, the plaintiff-appellee was
earning $665.40 per month. 110 The lost wages which he was awarded
were $701.97 per month.'' He was also allowed $240 per month
for maintenance for largely the same period." 2  Hence, by virtue of
his accident the seaman recovered $941.97 per month as lost prospec-
tive wages. Such figures are strong evidence of overlap or double
recovery. There can be little doubt that these damages were not merely
compensatory. Nevertheless, the court adopted the plaintiff's conten-
tion that since the maintenance obligation existed independently from
the wages obligation (where wages are sought on a negligence the-
ory), maintenance was due until maximal cure, no matter how lost
wages were computed.'
13
A Proposed Alternative and Some Reflections
on the Law of Admiralty
The result in Crooks is clearly reassuring for the members of the
merchant marine, especially those who have only recently taken to
the waves:
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). The amicus curiae also contended that if the defendant's
viewpoint were adopted the following result would occur: the shipowner's duty to
provide maintenance in a foreign port would turn entirely on whether, and at what
rate of pay the injured seaman had worked in other capacities before the voyage.
Id. at 4. This is not necessarily true. The problem would not arise at all if the in-
jured seaman sought no recovery for negligence. Then, he would be awarded main-
tenance (assuming no wilful misbehavior) without any retroactive inquiry into his
prior working record. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff were suing for negligence as
well, his maintenance and cure payments could be awarded at once. If negligence
were found, appropriate deductions could be made from the compensatory damage
award if the court thought that the libellant was being overly compensated.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Reply brief of Appellant at 4, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1972). This amount included a $35.00 per month living allowance; therefore the
raw wage was actually $630.00.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1972).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
MAINTENANCE AND SHORESIDE WAGES
[l]t is understandable why seamen . . . have fought valiantly to
retain their right to maintenance and cure (as well as rights under
the Jones Act and other remedial statutes) in preference to any
form of compulsory compensation. 114
Nevertheless, the words of Justice Holmes seem appropriate when con-
sidering the seaman's protected status vis h vis maintenance and cure
as well as numerous other areas of the law:11
[I]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than that it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past."1
6
By way of perspective, it must be borne in mind that maintenance
and cure developed at a time when the stricken sailor had no Jones
Act, nor the ready availability and understanding of eager attorneys
and admiralty judges to help him litigate any claims he might have
for common law negligence. Unquestionably, before the days of labor
unions and maritime safety legislation, the merchant seaman was easy
prey for the ruthless or unscrupulous shipowner. Fortunately, this
colorful tableau is not consonant with modern day reality.
While it may be heretical to attack the pervasive nature of the
maintenance remedy, with its origins in the ancient sea codes and its
continuous support from the Supreme Court," 7 the Crooks decision
merits criticism. Indeed, the entire philosophy of the judiciary towards
the merchant marine might well be scrutinized in view of the technical
and legislative advancements of modem times.
Originally, maintenance was designed as compensation for the
room and board which the seaman would have received had he re-
mained in the ship's service. Furthermore, it was an inducement for
men to accept arduous and perilous service in the merchant marine.
The first justification has been largely ignored since the nineteen thir-
ties;" 's cases now uniformly extend maintenance beyond the duration
114. 2 M. Norris, Tm Lw oF SE. mnN § 538 (3d ed. 1970).
115. For example, the seaman may sue in federal courts without prepayment of
posts or entering of security. 28 U.S.C. § 1916 (1970). If part of a seaman's wages
are withheld without sufficient cause, he can recover double pay for each day the
proper wage is withheld. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1970). If ill, he is cared for by the
U.S. Public Health Service, and the seaman has in effect something better than
workman's compensation in maintenance and cure and something better than an ordi-
nary tort action under the Jones Act, since the defenses of assumption of risk and
fellow servant are abolished. The list of seaman's benefits is considerably longer and
includes unusual procedures such as those by which the seaman may be released from
contracts. See Lovitt, Things Are Seldom What They Seem: The Jolly Little Wards of
the Admiralty, 46 A.B.A. J. 171 (1960).
116. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HIv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1920).
117. See text accompanying notes 15-25 supra.
118. See, e.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
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of the voyage (the period during which the seaman's room and board
were covered) until maximal cure is achieved. 119 Similarly, those de-
cisions allowing maintenance where the shipowner did not provide
room and board at all120 have likewise dispelled this early rationale.
As to the inducement concept, the courts are prone to express it
as dogma, ignoring a popular judicial corollary which might be termed
the "seaman as utter buffoon doctrine." The riddle may be expressed
as follows. Why, if seamen are treated as childlike and improvident in
so many areas of their existence' 2 ' can we expect them to know and
understand the nature of maintenance, a sometimes complex legal con-
cept, 122 and because of the existence of the maintenance remedy, be
induced to accept seaside service? Are seamen sophisticated when it
comes to benefits for which they are eligible and morons when it comes
to all their other dealings?
The more readily acceptable rationale for the continuation of
the maintenance remedy is that maritime service is still an inherently
dangerous occupation. It is also an area which is vitally important
to the national economy and commercial intercourse of the United States.
As to the danger, it is true that many vessels in merchant marine service
are World War II castoffs-flotation devices and little more. The
salty jargon for these crafts is "widow-makers", an expression which
needs no explanation. Furthermore, the ocean is hardly as predictable
as terra firma. The safest vessels still subject their crews to the whims
of Mother Nature.
A final reason for the preservation of maintenance is the recogni-
tion of the delays involved in recovering on a tort claim. The seaman
who seeks a Jones Act or common law recovery will generally have to
wait two to three years before his case is finally adjudicated. The sick
or injured sailor is in no position to support himself for such a period.
A promptly awarded maintenance allowance will at least insure that
he does not starve.
What is not justified, however, is the extension of the maintenance
remedy beyond its rational confines. Alternatives to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach in Crooks could be formulated without doing violence
to the judicial propensity for preserving the right of maintenance.
One simple alternative which avoids the overcompensation problem is
outlined below.
The first proposition would be that a seaman is entitled to prompt
119. See generally 2 M. NoRRs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 563 (3d ed. 1970).
120. See text accompanying notes 70-79 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
122. The Supreme Court constantly reminds us that the maintenance remedy
should remain simple and unfettered with legal complexities. But see, e.g., Farrell v.
United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
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payment of maintenance immediately after he becomes sick or in-
jured'23 and is required to support himself on land. There would be
no necessity for examining his prior working record at this point; nor
would the later institution of a tort suit for lost prospective wages dur-
ing incapacity have any effect on the sailor's right to receive main-
tenance in the hour of his need. Only if the seaman thereafter decided
to bring a Jones Act or unseaworthiness suit to recover lost wages dur-
ing his incapacity would there be an examination of his prior working
record. Under these circumstances, there would be two salient in-
quiries to make. First, what yardstick is being used to determine the
quantum of prospective lost wages during the recovery period in the
libellant's tort action? That is, are the seaman's prospective lost wages
computed on the basis of his prior landed employment salary, as in
the case of one who had only recently accepted maritime employment,
or are they based on prior shipside wages? Second, if they are based
on seaside wages, did, the seaman pay for his own room and board
while so employed?
If the claimed lost wages fell into the first category, under most
circumstances 124 the amount of tort damages for lost wages during
incapacity would be subject to a percentage offset equivalent to the
amount of maintenance received for those periods that are based on
landed salary rates. For the sake of uniformity the court could examine
the libellant's work record for a two year period before the injury. It
should then compute the percentage of time during which the seaman
123. This would not apply if it could be shown that the seaman's own wilful
misbehavior or concealment of a prior existing injury or illness caused the accident.
124. In unusual cases, as where the seaman's prior landed salary is less than the
amount he was earning aboard ship at the time of the injury, injustice would result
if the landed salary were awarded and maintenance payments received were deducted
from the amount of landed salary. Under these circumstances the trial judge should
be given broad discretion to either allow the seaman to recover his landed salary
without any offset for the maintenance he received, or allow the seaman to recover
the average wage he was making aboard ship at the time of the injury as well as the
maintenance previously awarded. The system proposed in the body of this note seeks
to prevent windfalls; it does not seek to work hardships. Hence, in the Wright case
where the seaman's prior landed wage was but $106 a week, he was quite possibly
earning a higher salary while working aboard ship. It would be for the trial judge
to determine whether the interests of justice required that a different wage scale be
used. In any case, the system proposed here would have permitted the seaman to re-
cover maintenance immediately after the injury occurred since the court found that
the plaintiff was indeed a "seaman," albeit a recent one. If the judge thereafter felt
that a windfall was occurring by virtue of the maintenance award and the salary
granted (the salary being based on shoreside employment salary rates) then he could
have activated the offset mechanism provided earlier. It seems, however, that the
plaintiff's lost prospective wages during incapacity were computed by examination of
such a low landed wage that the interests of justice merited the seaman being allowed
to keep maintenance as well as landed salary for the same period.
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worked shoreside, if any, and at sea. If, for example, seaman X
spent one-third of the prior two year period at sea and two-thirds of
the time working at nonmaritime pursuits, the two-thirds of his total
tort recovery which could be attributed to his landed employment
would be subject to an offeset equal to the amount of maintenance he
received for this period. This result follows since for two-thirds of the
time the seaman is recovering shoreside wages which should be suffi-
cient to cover his expenses on land. The remaining thirty-three per-
cent of the maintenance received would be kept by the plaintiff since
it corresponded to the time during which the sailor would probably have
been at sea.
In the second classification would fall the seaman who has not
been employed during the last two years in a shoreside capacity. As
to this group, the same procedure as above would be utilized, except
that the court would be looking to that percentage of the two years,
if any, during which the libellant was required to pay his own room
and board out of his wage. During these periods, the seaside salary
is basically the same as a shoreside salary since the sailor is required
to house and feed himself at his personal expense. Hence, they
would be accorded similar treatment in the system proposed here.
Thus, if a particular sailor spent twenty-five percent of the two years
under circumstances where he furnished his own room and board, he
would be subject to a twenty-five percent offset in his tort claim for
lost wages during the incapacity against the maintenance he received
for this period.
Application to Crooks
Had the foregoing proposal been followed by the court in the
Crooks case, the following result would have occurred. Crooks would
have been awarded maintenance upon injury for the duration of his
incapacity, subject only to depletion for those times he spent in the
Public Health Service hospital. This amount of maintenance was
$1200.125 When he later instituted suit for negligence and unsea-
worthiness, it would be incumbent upon the court to examine the two
year period prior to the accident to determine the capacity in which
the libellant was previously employed. While the court actually used
a fifteen month period, -1 2 6 for the sake of illustration it will be assumed
that the percentages of time spent at seaside and at shoreside tasks were
the same as those found in the actual decision-one-third of the period
at sea and two-thirds of the period on shore. Hence, $800 of the
125. Brief for Appellee at 2, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972).
126. Brief for Appellant at 10, Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1972).
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maintenance received (two-thirds of $1200) would be deducted from
the plaintiffs prospective lost wages recovery during the period of his
incapacity.
127
Consistent with the foregoing, it is submitted that the awards granted
in Richardson v. St. Charles-St. John the Baptist Bridge and Ferry Au-
thority,'28 Sylve v. E.W. Gravolet Canning Co.' 2 9 and Hudspeth v.
Atlantic & Gulf Stevadores, Inc.,'30 are subject to similar criticism.
Where a seaman's wages do not include his food and board while in
the service of the ship, he should not be allowed to recover this salary
in addition to the maintenance he received while incapacitated. The
alternative outlined above would not permit this full recovery of the
equivalent of shoreside wages (since the seaman was expected to fully
care for himself out of these amounts) as well as maintenance for the
same period. The City of Avalon 3' and Weiss v. Central R.R. Co. of
New Jersey'1 2 are distinguishable and their results sound for humani-
tarian reasons. In each of these cases the seaman did not seek a tort
recovery in addition to maintenance; he only sought to qualify for
maintenance alone. The proposal under discussion would allow both
of these men to qualify for maintenance notwithstanding the fact that
neither were supplied room and board while working for the ship-
owner at sea.
Application of this alternative standard would continue the policy
of providing the sick or injured seaman with prompt medical care as
well as a living allowance hopefully sufficient to sustain him during his
recovery. Thus, the dangerous nature of maritime service is given con-
tinued recognition, as is the realization that negligence suits often take
quite a long time to finally resolve. In those cases where the seaman's
past wages included room and board, there would be no alteration in
the existing law; his right to maintenance and cure as well as wages
would be undisturbed. In those cases where the quantum of lost
wages is determined by shoreside salary rates, or where the past wages
aboard ship did not include food and lodging, the availability of main-
tenance would not be affected during the critical time following the
injury; only if a later tort action were instituted would the offset mech-
anism be activated.
127. Under the system herein proposed, maintenance is granted as of right long
before the negligence action is adjudicated. Hence, it is assumed for this example that
the ship owner had already granted the plaintiff his full maintenance during his
incapacity. Thus, those amounts already received would be subject to being offset
against the plaintiff's ultimate lost wages claim.
128. 284 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1968).
129. 278 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. La. 1967).
130. 266 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1967).
131. 156 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1946).
132. 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956).
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Conclusion
Presently there is a paucity of case law on the particular fact situa-
tion found in the Crooks case. Yet, with the employment mobility
of modern America more and more maritime litigation will involve men
and women133 whose recent employment history is of a landed status.
It is sincerely hoped that the courts will take heed of the suggestions
in this note and bring a semblance of logic and direction to a chaotic
area of the law which has its roots in a bygone era. Some of the
staid institutions in the field of maintenance and cure,' as well as
those other areas of admiralty so ill-suited to the exigencies of twen-
tieth century maritime service, must be re-examined and brought into
step with present realities.
Daniel N. Stein*
133. This is especially true of women, who in the past have been roundly ex-
cluded from seaside maritime employment and in the future may be expected to en-
gage in this type of activity more and more.
134. On the issue of providing maintenance to "land-based" seamen, see the in-
telligent discussion in 46 TUL. L. REV. 877 (1972) which also attack's the judicial
propensity for non-justifiable expansion of the maintenance remedy to those who are
not within its logical purview.
* Member, Second Year Class
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